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31. INTRODUCTION
This seventh report from the Commission to the Council on the situation in world
shipbuilding, covering market developments in 2002, follows the Commission’s
obligation to report on the situation in the world shipbuilding market, laid down in
Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1540/981 and is in line with the previous
six reports2.
The Council decided on 27 June 2002 that the Commission should make a final
effort to solve the problems stemming from certain business practices by Korean
yards and achieve an amicable agreement with South Korea. As stated in the
Commission’s sixth report, no agreement with Korea could be reached.
In the absence of a negotiated solution, the Commission has initiated WTO action on
21 October 2002 and is now proceeding along this path. In addition and in line with
the Council decision of 27 June 2002 a Temporary Defensive Mechanism to
shipbuilding3 has entered into force on 2 July 2002. It authorises direct aid to
shipyards of up to 6% for certain ship types4 and is applicable to contracts signed as
of 24 October 2002.
On OECD level, negotiations for a new shipbuilding agreement started in December
2002. At this point in time it is, however, too early to predict the outcome of these
negotiations which will continue until 2005 at the latest.
In response to an earlier Council request, expressed in the Council conclusions of
May 2001, the EU shipbuilding industry has, together with the Commission,
launched the LeaderSHIP 2015 initiative which is designed to develop new working
structures and technology priorities and so sustain the Community’s shipbuilding
industry, in particular by establishing a level playing field world-wide and regionally.
It brings together all major industry players, trade unions and key EU policy makers
from the Commission and the Parliament. LeaderSHIP 2015 will look into all
pertinent shipbuilding issues, from world trade to skill challenges to joint naval
development and procurement. The initiative has already developed ideas for
possible lines of action to safeguard the future competitiveness of European
shipbuilding as a pro-active response to the situation in world shipbuilding. The
results of this work will be presented to the Council in the course of this year.
In addition to summarising the market developments in 2002 this report provides an
update of the previously undertaken cost investigations and adds some new cost
investigations made since the presentation of the sixth report.
                                                
1 OJ L 202, 18.07.1998, p.1
2 COM(1999) 474 final; COM(2000) 263 final; COM(2000) 730 final; COM(2001) 219 final;
COM(2002) 205 final; COM(2002) 622 final
3 Council Regulation EC No. 1177/2002
4 These ship types are container ships, product/chemical tankers and LNG carriers. The latter type is
subject to confirmation by the Commission that, on the basis of investigations covering the period of
2002, the Community industry has suffered material injury and serious prejudice in this market segment
caused by unfair Korean practices.
4As with previous reports, certain underlying key elements, e.g. concerning scope and
methodology of the market monitoring undertaken by the Commission, are not
repeated here. Those elements are covered in the previous reports and are listed in
the introduction to the fifth shipbuilding report.
2. MARKET ANALYSIS
2.1.1. Ordering activity and market shares
The various issues creating problems in the global shipbuilding market and in certain
segments thereof (past over-ordering, the US economic slowdown, the uncertainties
in the world economy and the effects of 11 September) have persisted throughout the
year 2002. Order intake in 2002 was lower than in 2000 and 2001 and reached a total
of 20.470.000 cgt (compared to 29.430.000 cgt in 2000 and 23.340.000 cgt in 2001,
source: Lloyd’s Register/OECD). Order intake therefore decreased by 12.3% for the
period 2001 to 2002, following a decrease of 20.7% for the period 2000 to 2001.
Most affected by deteriorating market conditions are container ships and cruise ships
(as visible in the next graph). Only one cruise ship order has been placed since
11 September 2001 and the cruise industry has clearly indicated that the period of
market consolidation is expected to continue for the next two or three years, i.e. new
orders for cruise ships will be limited and selective. For containerships some orders
in the Post-Panamax segment have been recorded, but ordering activity is well below
previous levels. The main container shipping operators stated losses or a significant
drop in profits in 2002 and are trying to increase their fleet of larger vessels in order
to lower unit costs in the mid-term future. With a great number of Post-Panamax
container ships entering the market in the coming 24 months, further freight rate
deterioration has to be expected in this market segment and investment has to be seen
in the light of market consolidation, rather than market expansion. Given that interest
rates are currently very low, some owners may be inclined to take the decision to
invest in new ships now, earlier than they would normally do.
Demand for other ship types, such as LNG carriers, chemical carriers and crude oil
carriers also declined, although to a lesser degree.
Only product tankers and bulk carriers have seen increased ordering, due to the
replacement of old tonnage following new EU maritime safety regulations (“Erika”
and “Prestige”) and Japanese and Chinese domestic demand, respectively. In the case
of bulk carriers demand has also been positively influenced by new design rules
coming into force after 1 July 2003. These rules will require a strengthening of
certain parts of the steel structure for ships contracted after that date, leading to an
estimated increase of 5% in steel weight and thus higher building costs. However,
these shiptypes are of low production value and competition for contracts in these
segments is fierce, leading to continued price depression.
The following graph shows the development of ordering activities in the years
2000-2002 for the major ship types (source: Lloyd’s Register/OECD/graph adapted
by Commission services).
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These developments affect the world’s main shipbuilding regions differently. While
Japanese yards continue to benefit from strong domestic demand for bulk carriers
since these orders are almost entirely placed in Japan (in keeping with traditional
ordering patterns, but also based on the fact that Japanese yards have optimised the
series production of this ship type), South Korea is battling with China for tanker
contracts, mainly for European owners. As this competition is almost entirely based
on price, substantial profits from these orders are not to be expected as evidenced in
the detailed cost investigations. EU shipyards are no longer active in these low-value
market segments. This results in a decreasing output volume for EU yards, clearly
visible from the market share development given below, which is expected to
continue and a number of job losses and yard closures in all major European
shipbuilding nations have occurred. The main hopeful segments for EU shipbuilders
are the ferry sector5 (mainly covering the category of Passenger/Ro-Ro vessels) and
small tankers6, where replacement needs are building up. However, these
developments have yet to materialise and may come too late for many yards running
out of work already in 2003 and 2004. In addition, it can be assumed that Korean
shipbuilders will try to get a foothold in these market segments through very low
offer prices.
                                                
5 Resulting from recently adopted EU legislation, regarding specific stability requirements for Ro-Ro
ships and safety rules and standards for passenger ships.
6 Following new EU maritime safety legislation adopted or proposed after the “Erika” and “Prestige”
accidents.
6The market shares developed as follows (based on cgt):
2000 2001 2002
South Korea 36 % 30 % 28 %
EU 19 % 13 % 7 %
Japan 26 % 33 % 37 %
China 7 % 11 % 13 %
All developments described above have to be seen in the light of a significant
production over-capacity in the shipbuilding sector, estimated to be at least 20%
above the levels required for the necessary replacement of old tonnage and the
accommodation of eventual additional demand stemming from increased sea-borne
trade7. This over-capacity continues to grow with new yard investments being
undertaken in particular in China and now also Vietnam. At the same time Korean
yards continue to expand existing production capacities, mainly through increased
sub-contracting of shipbuilding work contents, including steelworks. This should
have a continued negative effect on prices.
2.1.2. Price developments
Ship prices at the end of 2002 were generally lower than at the end of 2001.
According to Clarkson Research Studies, a leading source for price information, the
following trends were observed.
[The shiptypes appear as listed by Clarkson.]
[For container ships the container carrying capacity in TEU (Twenty-Foot-
Equivalent-Unit) is indicated, with ships above 5000 TEU falling into the category of
the so-called Post-Panamax container ships.]
[LNG carrier stands for Liquefied Natural Gas carrier, LPG carrier for Liquefied
Petroleum Gas carrier.]
[VLCC stands for Very Large Crude oil Carrier.]
[Ro-Ro indicates a roll-on/roll-off cargo ship.]
[The terms Aframax, Suezmax, Panamax, Capesize, Handymax and Handysize
indicate certain standard dimensions and specifications for tankers and bulk carriers,
respectively].
                                                
7 KSA, the Korean Shipbuilders’ Association, expects the excess capacity in 2005 to be 16.1%, while
AWES, the Association of European Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers, expects it to be 29.3% (Source:
OECD).
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Shiptype Price end 2001
(Mio. USD)
Price end 2002
(Mio. USD)
Change
VLCC tanker 70.00 63.50 -9,29%
Suezmax tanker 46.50 43.75 -5,91%
Aframax tanker 36.00 34.75 -3,47%
Panamax tanker 32.00 31.25 -2,34%
Handysize tanker 26.25 27.00 +2,86%
Capesize bulk carrier 36.00 36.25 +0,69%
Panamax bulk carrier 20.50 21.50 +4,88%
Handymax bulk carrier 18.50 19.00 +2,70%
Handysize bulk carrier 14.50 15.00 +3,45%
LNG carrier 165.00 150.00 -9,09%
LPG carrier 60.00 58.00 -3,33%
725 TEU container ship 13.00 13.00 0,00%
1000 TEU container ship 15.50 15.50 0,00%
1700 TEU container ship 21.50 21.00 -2,33%
2000 TEU container ship 28.00 27.00 -3,57%
2750 TEU container ship 31.00 29.50 -4,84%
4600 TEU container ship 52.00 45.00 -13,46%
6200 TEU container ship 72.00 60.00 -16,67%
Ro/Ro ship (small) 27.50 27.50 0,00%
Ro/Ro ship (large) 39.50 39.50 0,00%
From this table certain conclusions can be derived:
 Prices have been stable in those segments where EU yards are strong and Korean
yards are not particularly active, namely small container ships and Ro/Ro vessels.
 Prices have marginally increased (plus 2.9%) in the segment of small tankers due
to strong demand for replacement of older vessels, following new EU maritime
safety legislation (or the anticipation thereof). However, in the light of
significantly increased production costs in Korea and China (the countries where
most of these orders are currently placed) and the strong demand in this segment,
this price increase is very modest.
8 Prices have increased for all types of bulk carriers following strong domestic
demand in Japan and China and stricter design rules for this ship type coming into
force on 1 July 2003. As most orders are in Japan, the price discipline imposed by
the Japanese Government appears to be working and Chinese yards stick to the
price level pursued by the Japanese price leaders.
 Prices have again significantly deteriorated in those segments where Korean yards
see their main business (gas tankers and large container ships) and where they
compete directly with each other. This confirms the Commission’s earlier
conclusion that fierce competition in South Korea has a detrimental effect on the
world market and that prices seem to be set by the major Korean yards without
always respecting actual production costs.
It is noteworthy that the declining value of the US Dollar vis-à-vis the Euro, Won
and Yen should have led to a price increase (in USD) across the board. As this did
not happen, it has to be concluded that overall ship prices have dropped further. The
following graph shows the movements of the Won against the US Dollar for the
period II/1999-2002. The notable strengthening of the Won in 2002 and in particular
in the last quarter of 2002 should have forced Korean producers to ask higher US
Dollar prices, but this was not the case.
Exchange rate development Won per US Dollar
The ship price index maintained by the Commission reflects the price developments
(see graph). It shows that the modest price recovery in 2000 and 2001, when ordering
was strong, was not sustained and price levels are the lowest for more than a decade.
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3. Cost investigations
3.1.1. Update of previous cost investigations
In line with previous reports, this report contains an update of all previous cost
investigations undertaken by the Commission within its market monitoring exercise.
The methodology of these cost investigations has been described in the first two
shipbuilding reports and is not repeated here. The approach is continuously refined
As shipbuilding projects take significant time to be completed, and actual costs may
change until delivery of the vessel, the cost investigations have to be based on
forward assumptions. These assumptions are continuously reviewed and results are
updated whenever new or better information is received. This is reflected in the table
below. The reference to the shipbuilding report in which the particular order is
covered should be used to see the details of the order investigated. As the
Commission’s market monitoring progresses, ship orders previously investigated and
now completed can serve to verify the cost modelling. So far, updated figures are in
line with the original findings.
The abbreviations used refer to the following Korean shipyards:
DHI: Daewoo Heavy Industries
DSME: Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
HHI: Hyundai Heavy Industries
HMD: Hyundai Mipo Dockyard
HHIC: Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction
SHI: Samsung Heavy Industries
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Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected
new shipbuilding contracts (update December 2002)
SHIPYARD SHIPTYPE OWNER
CONTRACT
PRICE
(MIO.
USD)
NORMAL
PRICE
(MIO.
USD)
LOSS/GAIN
AS % OF
NORMAL
PRICE
REF. TO SHIP-
BUILDING
REPORT NO.
Daedong Product tanker Seaarland 21,5 25,7 –16 % 1
Daedong Panamax bulk
carrier
Sanama 18,5 26,0 – 29 % 1
Daedong Chemical tanker Cogema 24,5 30,2 –19 % 2
Daedong 2500 TEU EF Shipping 30,0 31,2 –4 % 4
STX (ex-
Daedong)
Product tanker Target Marine 25,5 28,7 –11 % 6
STX (ex-
Daedong)
Product tanker Byzantine
Marine
29,5 36,0 –18 % 6
STX (ex-
Daedong)
LPG carrier Qatar Shipping 30,0 40,1 –25 % 6
DHI VLCC Anangel 68,5 74,2 –8 % 1
DHI Ferry Moby 74,3 88,4 –16 % 2
DHI Panamax bulk
carrier
Chandris 22,5 22,8 –1 % 2
DHI LNG carrier Bergesen 151,1 164,2 –8 % 3
DHI ULCC Hellespont 85,0 93,7 –9 % 4
DSME
(ex-DHI)
LNG carrier Exmar 162,0 169,2 –4 % 5
Halla Panamax bulk
carrier
Diana 18,9 31,1 –39 % 1
Halla 3500 TEU Detjen 38,0 53,0 –28 % 1
Halla Capesize bulk
carrier
Cargocean 32,0 46,2 –31 % 2
Samho
(ex-Halla)
Aframax oil
tanker
Chartworld
Shipping
33,5 41,5 –19 % 4
Samho
(ex-Halla)
VLCC Oldendorff 69,5 90,9 –14 % 5
Samho
(ex-Halla)
Suezmax oil
tanker
Thenmaris 43,0 55,4 –19 % 5
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Samho (ex-
Halla)
Capesize bulk
carrier
Marmaras 36,0 53,6 –33 % 6
HHI 6800 TEU P&O Nedlloyd 73,5 81,6 –10 % 1
HHI 5600 TEU K Line 54,3 59,1 –8 % 2
HHI LNG carrier Bonny Gas 165,0 176,8 –7 % 2
HHI 5500 TEU Yang Ming 56,0 63,7 –13 % 2
HHI Ferry Stena 70,0 88,2 –21 % 4
HHI Suezmax oil
tanker
Jebsen 43,0 51,2 –16 % 4
HHI 7200 TEU Hapag-Lloyd 72,0 79,5 –9 % 3
HHI Suezmax oil
tanker
Athenian Sea
Carriers
43,0 49,9 –14 % 3
HHI LNG carrier Golar 162,6 178,4 –9 % 5
HHI Capesize bulk
carrier
Golden Union 36,0 45,2 –20 % 6
HHI 2500 TEU P&O Nedlloyd 27,5 32,7 –16 % 6
HMD Cable layer Ozone 37,3 46,8 –20 % 1
HMD Chemical tanker Bottiglieri 24,5 26,3 –7 % 4
HMD Product tanker Schoeller 26,0 27,1 –4 % 6
HHIC 6250 TEU Niederelbe 62,0 66,2 –6 % 3
HHIC 5608 TEU Conti 58,0 61,0 –5 % 3
HHIC 1200 TEU Rickmers 19,5 21,3 –8 % 3
Il Heung Chemical tanker Naviera Quimica 10,5 13,0 –19 % 2
SHI 5500 TEU Nordcapital 55,0 68,0 –19 % 2
SHI 3400 TEU CP Offen 36,0 52,4 –31 % 1
SHI Ferry Minoan 69,5 87,9 –21 % 1
SHI 7400 TEU OOCL 79,7 91,5 –13 % 4
SHI LNG carrier British Gas 162,5 176,5 –8 % 5
SHI 5762 TEU CP Offen 55,0 66,7 –18 % 5
Shina Product tanker Fratelli D'Amato 21,7 24,1 –10 % 3
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3.1.2. New cost investigations
Since the sixth shipbuilding report five new cost investigations have been
undertaken.
These concern the following orders placed in South Korean yards:
– 5 100 TEU container ship (series of 6), 40 776 cgt, to be built by Daewoo
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
– 4 900 TEU container ship (series of 4), 34 775 cgt, to be built by Hanjin Heavy
Industries and Construction
– Product/chemical tanker (series of 4), 24 480 cgt, to be built by STX
Shipbuilding Co. (ex-Daedong)
– Capesize bulk carrier, 26 250 cgt, to be built by Hyundai Heavy Industries
– Product tanker (series of 4), 23 200 cgt, to be built by Hyundai Mipo Dockyard
The results of these cost investigations are summarised below.
Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected new
ships (new investigations)
SHIPYARD SHIPTYPE OWNER
CONTRACT
PRICE
(MIO. USD)
NORMAL
PRICE
(MIO. USD)
LOSS/GAIN AS %
OF NORMAL PRICE
DSME 5100 TEU Hamburg Süd 58.0 64.5 -10%
HHIC 4900 TEU MSC 45.0 48.3 -7%
STX Product /
chemical
tanker
Safmarine Corp. 27.0 37.0 -27%
HHI Capesize bulk
carrier
Transmed
Shipping
36.0 46.4 -22%
HMD Product tanker Athenian Sea
Carriers
27.8 36.1 -23%
These results confirm the findings from previous reports. Korean yards continue to
sell ships at prices that appear to be below normal price (full costs of production plus
a profit margin of 5%). Typically prices seem to be set at a level that covers direct
operating costs but which does not include provisions for inflation and all financial
costs. As prices for ships from Korean yards have stayed at historical lows in the
reporting period, while costs of production have increased, the gap between contract
price and normal price is widening further. For the latest investigations this gap is
20% on average (not weighted), while it was 8% for those in the fifth report issued a
year ago.
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Korean yards, with their enormous production capacities, are particularly affected by
any market downturn as they need to fill their large building docks and assure
enough cash flow to roll over their short terms debts. As a result indications are that
Korean yards are trying to get hold of almost any order that appears in the market, no
matter whether those orders will be profitable in the light of Korean costs or not. It is
noteworthy that Korean yards’ orderbooks are increasingly dominated by tankers,
despite the announcement made in March 2001 by the executive vice president and
chief marketing officer of Hyundai Heavy's shipbuilding division who said that HHI
“planned to focus on boosting profit margins by being more selective in receiving
orders”8. Other yard managers equally said that Korean yards will move away from
the tanker and bulk carrier market segments as cost increases due to higher wages,
inflation and exchange rate movements no longer allow to achieve a profit on lower
value vessels. This development has not materialised and consequently, a number of
Korean shipyards have reported losses for 2002. Other yards have reported pro-
forma profits.
Of particular interest is the investigated order for a 5100 TEU container ship for
Hamburg Süd. This order received bids from one European and two Korean yards.
DSME finally won the order with an offer price of 55.0 Mio. USD, leading to a
complaint by SHI to the Korean Government about price under-cutting by DSME.
The Korean Government then ordered DSME to raise the price to SHI’s level of 58.0
Mio. USD. As a justification of this exceptional move by the Korean Government
(which repeatedly had claimed vis-à-vis the Commission to have no influence on
business practices of Korean yards) the Director of the shipbuilding division at the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy stated that “Daewoo’s price offer,
which looks too low in view of the market prices, might hurt fair competition and
damage (the) credibility of Korean exporters”9. It is unclear whether DSME actually
increased the price, as Hamburg Süd insists that the contract was signed at the price
of 55.0 Mio USD and they saw no reason to accept such a substantial change.
                                                
8 Interview with Reuters, 7 March 2001
9 Lloyd’s List of 11 November 2002
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The serious difficulties in world shipbuilding continue, with decreasing order intake
in the major shipbuilding regions and prices locked at a very low level. The main
reasons are production over-capacities, past over-supply, slowing economies around
the world and the effects of 11 September. The latter issue had a significant impact
on the short and mid term prospects of the cruise industry and thus the demand for
new cruise ships. Fierce intra-Korean competition has to be seen at the core of
depressed prices for most ship types. Only Japanese and Chinese yards currently still
manage to increase sales through stable domestic demand and good price
competitiveness, respectively.
World-wide ordering for new ships in 2002 was down by ca. 12% compared to 2001.
In the EU, where production increasingly focussed on cruise ships, the situation is
much worse, with ordering being down by more than 50% compared to the year 2001
and more than 70% compared to the year 2000.
Most affected by weaker ordering activity are container ships and cruise ships, but
crude oil tankers, chemical tankers and LNG carriers have also seen lower demand.
Demand has increased in the segment of product tankers, due to replacement needs
stemming from new EU maritime safety legislation, and in the segment of bulk
carriers. However, this additional demand had a very limited impact on prices.
As a result shipyards are running out of work and a number of bankruptcies and lay-
offs, mainly in Europe, have already occurred.
Prices for new ships have declined further and are now at the lowest level for more
than a decade. Prices increases were not achieved in 2002 and are equally unlikely in
2003.
Yards in South Korea have further lowered offer prices, despite increases in all major
cost factors and, based on the Commission’s analysis, a number of Korean yards may
soon find it difficult to meet their short-term financial obligations.
The Commission’s detailed cost investigations for orders placed in South Korean
yards confirm the findings from previous reports, namely that ships are offered at
prices which do not seem to cover the full costs of production. Typically, provisions
for inflation and debt servicing are not included in Korean offer prices. The
investigations show that the gap between offer prices and calculated normal price is
again widening.
